Sharon Revisited: Netanyahu’s Ultimate Aim in Gaza and Why It Will Fail

Israel seems to repeat its past mistakes.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s current strategy in Gaza is a flawed imitation of tactics used by previous Israeli leaders. If those tactics had worked, Israel wouldn’t be in its current predicament.

Netanyahu’s lack of clear objectives in Gaza stems from the uncertainty he and his generals face regarding the outcomes of their ongoing conflict in the region. This war has resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of innocent civilians.

Despite his efforts, Netanyahu cannot replicate the past.

After Israel occupied Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem in June 1967, Israeli politicians and military leaders largely agreed on their goals. The government aimed to turn its military victory over Arab armies into a lasting occupation. The military wanted to use the newly acquired territories to create ‘buffer zones’ and ‘security corridors’ to further control the Palestinians.

Both the government and the military saw the establishment of new settlements as the perfect solution to their shared vision. Today’s illegal settlements were initially part of two major security corridors proposed by then-Labour Minister Yigal Allon.

The Allon Plan included several elements, such as building a security corridor along the Jordan River and another along the Green Line, Israel’s pre-1967 borders. These new boundaries were intended to expand Israel’s undefined borders, providing greater strategic depth. This plan was the original annexation scheme, which Netanyahu revived in 2019 and is now being advanced by current Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich.

Netanyahu is also looking through past government strategies to find a solution to his disastrous war in Gaza. Here, too, the Allon Plan is relevant.

In 1971, then-General Ariel Sharon tried to implement Allon’s idea of complete control over Gaza, but with his own twist. He introduced what became known as Sharon’s ‘five fingers.’

The ‘fingers’ referred to military zones and settlements designed to divide the Gaza Strip into sections and separate the southern city of Rafah from the Sinai region.

To achieve this, thousands of Palestinian homes were destroyed throughout Gaza, especially in the north. In the south, thousands of Palestinian families, mostly Bedouin tribes, were forcibly relocated to the Sinai desert.

Sharon’s plan, an extension of Allon’s plan, was never fully implemented, though many aspects were carried out at the expense of the Palestinians, whose resistance continued for many years. This resistance, expressed through the collective defiance of Gaza’s population, eventually forced Sharon, then Prime Minister, to withdraw from Gaza altogether. He called his 2005 military redeployment and subsequent siege on Gaza the ‘disengagement plan.’

The relatively new plan, which Netanyahu rejected back then but is trying to revive now, seemed like a rational response to Israel’s unsuccessful occupation of Gaza. After 38 years of military occupation, the experienced Israeli General, known to Palestinians as the ‘bulldozer,’ realized that Gaza could not be subdued or governed.

Instead of learning from Sharon’s experience, Netanyahu is trying to repeat the same mistake.

Though Netanyahu has revealed few details about his future plans in Gaza, he has often spoken of retaining ‘security control’ over the Strip and the West Bank. Israel will “maintain operational freedom of action in the entire Gaza Strip,” he said last February.

Since then, his army has begun constructing what appears to be a long-term military presence in central Gaza, known as the Netzarim Corridor – a large ‘finger’ of military routes and encampments that splits Gaza into two halves.

Netzarim, named after a former settlement southwest of Gaza City evacuated in 2005, also gives Israel control over the area’s two main highways, Salah Al-Din Road and the coastal Rashid Road.

The Philadelphi Corridor, located between Rafah and the Egyptian border, was occupied by Israel on May 7. It is intended to be another ‘finger.’ Additional ‘buffer zones’ already exist in all of Gaza’s border regions, aiming to fully suffocate Gaza and give Israel total control over aid.

However, Netanyahu’s plan is doomed to fail.

The historical circumstances of the 1967 Israeli occupation of Gaza are entirely different from the current situation. The former resulted from a major Arab defeat, while the latter is a consequence of Israel’s military and intelligence failures.

Moreover, regional circumstances now favor Palestine, and global awareness of Israel’s ongoing actions in Gaza makes a permanent war nearly impossible.

Another important point is that the current generation of Gazans is empowered and fearless. Their ongoing resistance reflects a broader awakening throughout Palestine.

Finally, the unity that followed the 1967 war is absent today, as Israel is divided along many fault lines.

Netanyahu should reconsider his decision to maintain a permanent presence in Gaza, as defeating Gaza has proven to be an impossible task even for far more capable military leaders in his country.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.